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THE CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE: A
WINDFALL FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR
JEAN G. ZORN*
HAROLD MAYERSON**
I. INTRODUCTION
The Reagan administration's economic assistance program for
the countries of Central America and the Caribbean, nicknamed
the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) by the administration, was
publicly announced by President Reagan in a speech to the Organ-
ization of American States on February 24, 1982. However, the na-
ture and goals of the program had been clear to the administration
for several months." The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act,
(Act) a bill which sets forth the economic aspects of the program,
was submitted to Congress on March 17, 1982.2
* B.A., 1964, University of California at Berkeley; M.A., 1968, J.D., 1972, University of
Wisconsin, Madison; Admitted to the Massachusetts (1976) and New York (1978) bars.
** B.A., 1962, Hunter College; LL.B., 1967, Brooklyn Law School; Admitted to the New
York Bar (1967).
1. Administration representatives described the Caribbean Basin program in an outline
to a Congressional subcommittee in July 1981. Their descriptions highlight most of the ma-
jor aspects of the program, including its focus on bilateral aid, common treatment of Central
America and the Caribbean Islands, exclusion of Cuba and Nicaragua, support for private
enterprise, and the linkage of free trade, investment credit, and economic aid. The Carib-
bean Basin Policy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Inter-American Affairs of the House
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 133-79 (1981) (statements of Thomas 0.
Enders, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Stephen Lande, Assistant
U.S. Trade Representative for Bilateral Affairs, and John R. Bolton, General Counsel,
Agency for International Development) [hereinafter cited as 1981 Hearings].
2. The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act [hereinafter referred to as the Act],
H.R. 5900, was submitted by President Reagan to the House of Representatives on March
17, 1982, and referred to the Ways and Means Committee and the Committee on Foreign
Affairs, which held hearings on the bill in March and April 1982 and reported the bill to the
House on August 9, 1982. The bill was introduced in the Senate, as S.2237, 97th Cong., 2d
Seas., 128 CONG. RIc. 2422-26 (1982), on March 18, 1982, and referred in part to the Com-
mittee on Finance and in part to the Foreign Relations Committee, which held hearings on
the bill in July 1982. See Caribbean Basin Initiative: Hearings on S.2237 Before the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong., 2d Seas. (1982) [hereinafter cited as 1982 Hear-
ings]. The House of Representatives approved on September 9, 1982 and the Senate ap-
proved on September 10, 1982 a supplemental appropriations bill, including the $350 mil-
lion aid component of the Act. On December 18, 1982, the House of Representatives
approved the trade and investment tax credit portions of the bill, but the bill did not reach
the floor of the Senate. President Reagan has promised ambassadors from the Organization
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The administration describes the CBI as "a program that rep-
resents a long-term commitment to the countries of the Caribbean
and Central America."' However, the commitment evidenced by
the Act and by the statements of administration officials, including
the President, describing and supporting it, is neither long-term"
nor directed at the governments or peoples of the Caribbean area.
The CBI has two primary purposes: first, to assist private enter-
prise, particularly United States businesses, by making the Carib-
bean region open to and safe for foreign and domestic private in-
vestment; and, second, to ensure the economic and military
security of the United States by preserving its predominance in the
western hemisphere.
In this article, we shall briefly examine the relationship of the
CBI to the Reagan administration's perceptions of national secur-
ity interests. Our major focus, however, will be on the Act and its
relevance to the private sector. We shall then review the Act, ana-
lyzing how each provision, in combination with other aspects of the
CBI, will protect and promote private investment in the region.
We shall conclude our review of the Act with a discussion of its
likely consequences. The CBI, a program aimed at making signifi-
cant sectors of the Third World safe for private investment in gen-
eral, and for foreign investment from the United States in particu-
lar, is likely to lead, for the countries on which it is imposed, not to
the development of integrated and stable economies, but to depen-
dence, to increasing debt and foreign exchange burdens, and to
growing inequalities between rich and poor.
II. THE CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE
Administration spokesmen have repeatedly emphasized the
Caribbean Basin Initiative's support for private enterprise. In his
message to Congress accompanying submission of the Act, Presi-
dent Reagan underlined the connection:
of American States that the bill will be re-introduced in the next session of Congress. N.Y.
Times, Dec. 23, 1982 at D14.
3. President's Speech to the Organization of American States, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 217, 219 (March 1, 1982) [hereinafter cited as OAS Speech]. Similarly, the Act, as
drafted by the administration, styles itself "[a] Bill to promote economic revitalization and
facilitate expansion of economic opportunity in the Caribbean Basin Region." H.R. 5900,
Preamble.
4. The Act provides aid for only one fiscal year (§ 201), duty-free trade benefits for
twelve years (§ 105) and investment tax credits for property placed in service within five
years (§ 303).
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A key principle of the program is to encourage a more produc-
tive, competitive and dynamic private sector, and thereby pro-
vide the jobs, goods and services which the people of the Basin
need for a better life for themselves and their children. All the
elements of this program are designed to help establish the con-
ditions under which a free and competitive private sector can
flourish.'
The program's supporters, however, have fostered the notion that
the private sectors to be supported are primarily those indigenous
to the countries of the Caribbean and Central America:
The program. . .is integrated and designed to improve the lives
of the peoples of the Caribbean Basin by enabling them to earn
their own way to a better future. It builds on the principles of
integrating aid, self-help and participation in trade and
investment. ..
The Act belies this. The private sector which it will support is that
based in the United States.7 The Act attempts to assist United
States corporations and investors in two ways. First, its free trade
and investment tax credit provisions are intended to increase the
profitability of United States investments in the region. Second,
the conditions attached to its grants of aid and of free trade status
are intended to coerce countries into changing their foreign invest-
ment laws and policies so as to make themselves welcome pros-
pects for investment from the United States.
The Act is divided into three parts: it "is based on integrated
and mutually-reinforcing measures in the fields of trade, invest-
5. President's Message to Congress on the Caribbean Basin Initiative, 18 WEEKLY
Comep. PREs. Doc. 323, 326 (March 22, 1982). [hereinafter cited as Message to Congress]. See
Statement by AID Administrator M. Peter McPherson on the Caribbean Basin Initiative,
5 AGENDA 4 (1982). Mr. McPherson is Administrator, Agency for International Develop-
ment, and Agenda is published by AID. See also 1981 Hearings, supra note 1, at 138-39,
146, 156 (statements of Enders, Lande and Bolton) and 1982 Hearings, supra note 2, at 40
(statement of Raymond J. Weldman), 48-49 (statement of McPherson).
6. Message to Congress, supra note 5, at 324. See also 1981 Hearings, supra note 1, at
153-60 (statement of Bolton).
7. United States businessmen have not been slow to recognize that the Act is intended
to benefit them. See Johnson, The Caribbean Basin Initiative: A Positive Departure, 47
FOREIGN POL'Y 118 (1982). Mr. Johnson is executive director of Caribbean/Central American
Action, a non-profit organization promoting economic development in the Caribbean Basin.
See also Hughes, The Caribbean Basin Economic Renewal: New Opportunities for Ameri-
can Business, Bus. AM., Mar. 8, 1982, at 18. Ms. Hughes is Acting Deputy Asst. Secretary
for Commerce for the Western Hemisphere. See also 1982 Hearings, supra note 2, at 149-75
(statements of Archie L. Monroe, President, Esso Inter-America, Inc.; Charles W. Parry,
President, Aluminum Co. of America).
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ment and financial assistance."8 We shall look at each of these
measures in turn. First, however, we must consider the conditions
which the Act will impose upon countries seeking to become bene-
ficiaries of the CBI, because it is in large part through these condi-
tions that the United States will impose its views regarding private
investment on the countries of the Caribbean and Central
America.
A. Beneficiary Country Status
The Caribbean Basin Initiative is intended to be both larger
and smaller than the Carribean rim. The Act includes El Salvador,
which is separated by both Guatemala and Honduras from the
Caribbean, and omits Martinique, Guadaloupe and other French
Caribbean islands, while including certain British and Dutch Car-
ibbean possessions.'
Moreover, not all countries listed in the Act as part of the Car-
ibbean Basin will be deemed eligible for duty-free treatment or for
the investment tax credit. 10 Only those countries which the Presi-
dent of the United States designates as beneficiary countries will
qualify." The Act sets out conditions for designation as a benefi-
ciary country. These conditions make it plain that beneficiary sta-
tus will be conferred only upon those countries that, in the opinion
of the Reagan administration, are prepared to provide a risk-free
environment for United States business and investment.
The Act attempts to gain for United States investors protec-
tions that international law may no longer recognize as their due.
It prohibits the President, with some exceptions, from designating
as a beneficiary country any country that has "nationalized, expro-
priated or otherwise seized ownership or control of property owned
by a United States citizen or by a corporation, partnership or asso-
ciation which is 50 percent or more beneficially owned by United
8. Message to Congress, supra note 5, at 324.
9. Act, supra note 2, § 102(d). Perhaps this occurs because the French islands are
deemed by French law to be integral parts of France, whereas those islands belonging to the
United Kingdom and the Netherlands are administered as colonies or territories. In addi-
tion, so as not to unduly offend Puerto Rico and the United States Virgin Islands, various
benefits conferred by the Act are available to all U.S. possessions, which may extend the
Caribbean Basin four thousand miles to Guam, American Samoa, Palmyra Atoll, and other
islands in the Pacific. See id. §§ 102(d), 306.
10. Nor will all Caribbean Basin countries receive aid. For a list of proposed aid recipi-
ents, see infra text accompanying notes 65-68.
11. Act, supra note 2, §§ 102, 303.
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States citizens."'" Any incidents of creeping expropriation will also
disqualify a country: beneficiary status must be denied to any
country that "has taken steps to repudiate or nullify a contract"
with persons from the United States or "has imposed or enforced
taxes or other exactions, restrictive maintenance or operational
conditions, or other measures with respect to property so owned" if
in effect of such contract cancellation or taxation or regulatory
measure was "to nationalize, expropriate, or otherwise seize owner-
ship or control of such property. '" s
There are exceptions to these prohibitions. A country may at-
tain beneficiary status, despite past misdeeds, "if the President de-
termines that such designation will be in the national economic or
security interest of the United States."1 4 Beneficiary status will
also be available to countries which have paid "prompt, adequate
and effective compensation" to expropriated investors or are nego-
tiating the terms of such compensation at international law.1'
These provisions of the Act embody the views of the United
States as to the responsibilities, under international law, of host
countries to foreign investors, views not necessarily shared by the
countries of the Caribbean Basin.' 6 The positions of the United
States and of Third World countries with respect to these issues
differ in three basic respects. First, the United States, as an invest-
ing country, has often espoused the position that expropriation, in
any form and for any reason, constitutes a violation of interna-
tional law principles. This position has been disputed by Third
12. Id. § 102(b)(2)(A).
13. Id. §§ 102(b)(2)(B) and (C). The Act does not specify who will determine, or on
what grounds, that the effect of a host country law is so severe as to constitute expropria-
tion. This is an area in which there can be significant differences of opinion. A forty-five
percent taxation measure for example, that looks to a foreign investor like seizure of his
assets, may strike the taxing authority as a reasonable corporate levy. Even arbitrators may
disagree. See In re Revere Copper & Brass, Inc.-O.P.I.C.: Arbitral Award in Dispute In-
volving U.S. Investment Guaranty Program (Aug. 24, 1978), 17 LL.M. 1321 [hereinafter
cited as In re Revere].
14. Act, supra note 2, § 102(b). The Act thereby permits beneficiary status for Jamaica,
which was found by a U.S. arbitration panel to have imposed levies and regulatory measures
on a subsidiary of Reynolds Aluminum sufficiently stringent as to constitute expropriation.
In re Revere, supra note 13.
15. Act, supra note 2, § 102(b)(2)(D).
16. For a fuller discussion of these contrary positions, and the ramifications of the de-
bate for international law, see H. SmwuR and D. VAGTS, TRANs-NATIONAL LAw (1974); Fer-
guson, The Politics of the New International Economic Order, 32 Paoc. AM. AcAD. POL.
Sci. 142 (1977); Ferguson, Redressing Global Injustices: The Role of Law, 33 RuTGms L.
Rlv. 410, 415-21 (1981).
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World countries, which are more likely to be the subjects of foreign
investment. It is their position that the sovereignty of each nation
over its resources makes valid any expropriation that is carried out
in a non-discriminatory manner and for a public purpose. Second,
the United States has at times expressed the view that any taxa-
tion or regulation of a foreign investor by a host country, if deemed
excessive by the United States, constitutes expropriation of the in-
vestment, whereas host countries tend to respond that regulation
and taxation within their borders are necessary functions of any
government. Moreover, the United States, which prefers that its
citizens be taxed and regulated as little as possible by any govern-
ment except itself, may view as excessive, and therefore as ex-
propriatory, measures that Third World governments believe are
necessary if the host country is to receive adequate recompense for
the venture or to maintain control of its economic future. Finally,
the United States has taken the position that expropriated proper-
ties must be paid for immediately, fully and in convertible cur-
rency, while expropriating governments, particularly those at-
tempting to carry out large-scale land reform programs or to
nationalize major mining or utilities projects, contend that long-
term repayment plans in local currency constitute adequate com-
pensation at international law.
Although the positions espoused by the United States are
those of the traditional international law treatises and decisions,
the views of Third World countries have been adopted by the
United Nations and may be gaining support among a sufficiently
large number of states to be considered as generally accepted prin-
ciples of international law. The Reagan administration is attempt-
ing to win the debate by circumventing it through the Act which
embodies the views of the United States as to the proper behavior
of host countries towards investors from the United States. Any
Caribbean or Central American country wishing to participate in
the free trade or investment tax credit benefits of the Act must
demonstrate its concurrence with United States' views in order to
do so.
The Act, in obtaining for its citizens preferential economic
treatment in other countries, suggests that the United States is not
satisfied merely to impose on such countries its views as to the
treatment of investors required by international law.'7 A country
17. In addition to the requirements for obtaining beneficiary country status described
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may be refused beneficiary country status, even though it satisfies
these conditions imposed by the Act, if it fails to create the politi-
cal and legal environment that the Reagan administration believes
will support and sustain private enterprise. In addition to its obli-
gatory conditions, the Act permits the President of the United
States, in determining whether to confer beneficiary country sta-
tus, to "take into account" such ill-defined matters as "the eco-
nomic conditions in such country," "the extent to which such
country has assured the United States it will provide equitable and
reasonable access to the markets and basic commodity resources of
such country," and "the degree to which such country is under-
taking self-help measures to promote its own economic
development."""
"Self-help" has become a catch word among proponents of the
CBI, l" and it has taken on a special connotation in their lexicon.
Since the Reagan administration equates economic development
with industrial growth, and believes that industrialization should
be accomplished by private investment, "self-help" means to the
Reagan administration that countries will "create predictable,
favorable conditions for enterprise. 2' To do this, the Reagan ad-
above, the Act also requires that beneficiary status be refused to any country that "fails to
act in good faith in recognizing as binding or in enforcing arbitral awards in favor of"
United States citizens or corporations and to any country that "affords preferential treat-
ment to the products of a developed country, other than the United States, which has, or is
likely to have, a significant adverse effect on United States commerce." Act, supra note 2, §
102(b)(3) and (4). Section 102(b)(1) of the Act also refuses beneficiary country status to any
country "if such country is a Communist country." See infra text accompanying notes 93-
96.
18. Act, supra note 2, § 102(c). Other items which, under § 102(c), the President may
also take into account include the concurrence of a country's trade policies with GATT
principles, "the degree to which such country uses export subsidies or imposes export per-
formance requirements or local content requirements which distort international trade,"
whether the country is "contributing to the revitalization of the region," and, a sop to the
moderates, "the degree to which workers in such country are afforded reasonable work-place
conditions and enjoy the right to organize and bargain collectively." Since this list indis-
criminantly mixes positive and negative items, it is interesting to speculate as to which
items a country must receive a plus on, and which a minus, in order to qualify for benefi-
ciary status.
19. Message to Congress, supra note 5, at 324; OAS Speech, supra note 3, at 219; 1981
Hearings, supra note 1, at 135 (statement of Enders), 156 (statement of Bolton); 1982 Hear-
ings, supra note 2, at 33 (statement of William Brock, U.S. Trade Representative), 41
(statement of Weldman), and 49 (statement of McPherson).
20. 1981 Hearings, supra note 1, at 135 (statement of Enders). Other administration
officials, at both the subcommittee hearings in 1981 and the Foreign Relations Committee
hearings in 1982, also testified that a major purpose of the Caribbean Basin Initiative is to
pull both the U.S. and Caribbean governments back from ecomonic activism, so as to create
conditions considered by the Reagan administration to be suitable for private enterprise:
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ministration believes countries "must reform many of their eco-
nomic policies and structures in profound and sometimes painful
ways in order to take advantage of the new economic opportunities
of this program. '2 1 They may be expected, for example, to reduce
public sector activity in and control of the economy, repeal laws
limiting the areas in which foreign investors may operate or the
profits that foreign investors may remit, ensure foreign investors
against expropriation and other risks, and reduce taxes and import
duties. Further, they may be expected to execute bilateral invest-
ment treaties with the United States providing for arbitration at
international law of all foreign investor grievances, most favored
company status for United States investors, and unrestricted repa-
triation or transfer of profits and assets.2 Underlying this attempt
by the Reagan administration to cause Caribbean Basin countries
to alter their policies towards foreign and domestic private invest-
ment is the erroneous assumption that these countires have caused
their own underdevelopment by not permitting the private sector
to operate free of all governmental restraints.
2 3
The provisions of the Act relating to beneficiary country sta-
"We realize that to be successful we must limit the role of our government and engage the
vitality and energy of the private sector. For countries which are interested, we would hope
that they could develop an environment conducive to both foreign and domestic invest-
ment." Id. at 148 (statement of Lande); 1982 Hearings, supra note 2, at 44 (statement of
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Deputy Secretary of State).
21. Message to Congress, supra note 5, at 326.
22. These specific recommendations as to ways in which Caribbean Basin governments
might act in order to qualify for beneficiary status were put forth by Reagan administration
spokesmen in 1981 Hearings, supra note 1, at 138, 139, 164 (statement of Enders); 148-49,
164 (statement of Lande); and 155, 156, 163 (statement of Bolton). See also U.S. D Er. o
STATE, BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, BACKGROUND ON THE CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE, SPECIAL
REPORT No. 97, at 5 (Mar. 1982): [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL REPORT No. 97] "It is gener-
ally agreed that the U.S. prototype [bilateral investment treaty] treats the investment issue
more comprehensively than the treaties signed by other developed countries and has the
potential to have a greater impact on investment climates in less developed countries...
The United States is prepared to negotiate bilateral treaties with interested countries in the
Caribbean Basin."
23. An administration spokesman refers to the present activist economic policies of
Caribbean and Central American governments as "major impediments to private investment
in the Basin." 1981 Hearings, supra note 1, at 149 (statement of Lande). Another adminis-
tration official testified, "most Caribbean Basin countries are still following policies that
result in substantial price disincentives, sometimes including overvalued exchange rates,
that constrain both agricultural and industrial production. . . .These policies must be re-
versed if the Caribbean Basin countries are to take advantage of the greater opportunities
that might be available in external markets. Another constraint in many countries is the
overall investment climate, clouded by unclear government attitudes toward private-sector
activity." Id. at 155 (statement of Bolton). For the contrary view that foreign investment
may inhibit, rather than promote, development, see infra text accompanying notes 118-27.
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tus are an attempt to cajole Caribbean and Central American
countries into favoring foreign and domestic private investment by
denying the free trade and investment tax credit benefits of the
Caribbean Basin program to those countries which refuse to do so.
This attempt to alter the economic policies of the Caribbean Basin
countries will succeed, however, only to the extent that govern-
ments in the region decide that free trade extensions and the bene-
fits to them of investment tax credits are worth the effort. Since, as
we will discuss below, these proffered emoluments may be of rela-
tively minor benefit to most countries in the region, they may well
decide that this is an occasion when the carrot is no better than
the stick.
B. Investment Tax Credit
The most important aspect of the CBI from the perspective of
United States corporations may be the provision in the Act of an
investment tax credit for investments in machinery and equipment
to be used predominantly in qualified Caribbean Basin countries.
The Act provides that any United States corporation may claim a
credit against its overall United States tax liability, in an amount
equal to ten percent of its investment in any such machinery and
equipment that is put into service within five years from passage of
the Act.14
The credit will apply to both new and used property, so long
as the used property has not had its prior use predominantly in
any of the countries for which the credit is available." Thus, a
multinational corporation can take advantage of the credit by clos-
ing down components factories in Third World countries that do
not get the benefit of the tax credit and moving the equipment to
the Caribbean Basin.
The Act intends that the credit be available only to United
States citizens and companies incorporated in the United States:
foreign corporations, even though liable for United States taxes,
are explicitly excluded from using the credit.' Since a great deal of
United States foreign investment is channeled through subsidiar-
24. Act, supra note 2, § 303(a). The credit may also be claimed for investments in the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands and other "possessions of the United
States." Id. § 306.
25. Id. § 303(b). It will be up to the United States Department of the Treasury to
define "predominant use." Id. § 304.
26. Id. § 303(d).
19831
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ies, wholly or partially owned by a United States parent and incor-
porated in the host country, United States parent corporations of
foreign companies and United States corporations in joint ventures
with foreign companies may claim a credit roughly proportionate
to their share of the investment.27 The credit will be based on the
lesser of the shareholder's pro rata share of the foreign company's
interest in the investment or the increase in the shareholder's basis
in the stock of the foreign company from passage of the Act to
claiming of the credit.
28
The investment tax credit provides an incentive to United
States businessmen not only to invest in Caribbean and Central
American countries but to pressure those countries in which they
wish to invest to qualify for the credit. It can be claimed only for
property used predominantly in those Caribbean Basin countries
which have been designated as deserving of beneficiary status
under the Act.29 As discussed above, beneficiary status will be ac-
corded only to those countries which can demonstrate that they
are not hostile to foreign investment.30 In addition, to be eligible
for the investment tax credit, the country must have executed a
treaty with the United States, binding both to share tax-related
information, "including information which may otherwise be sub-
ject to nondisclosure provisions of the local law of the beneficiary
country." s
Although the investment tax credit would be a boon to busi-
ness, it is not expected to be of significant assistance to countries
in the Caribbean Basin region. While the Department of the Trea-
sury estimates that it will cost the United States approximately
forty million dollars in uncollected taxes in its first year in effect,32
27. Id. § 304. The provision applies to United States persons (corporations, other forms
of business entities and natural persons) who own "five percent or more in value of the
outstanding stock of a foreign corporation," thus permitting the creation of tax credit syndi-
cations in the United States.
28. Id. Although the Caribbean Basin investment tax credit is in most aspects merely
an extension of the domestic investment tax credit, the calculations of the credit for United
States shareholders of foreign corporations "is slightly different than the domestic tax credit
which calculates the credit on the basis of actual investment expenditures, and will probably
amount to slightly less, since qualifying domestic property is sometimes financed through
debt." 1982 Hearings, supra note 2, at 219 (statement of Richard E. Feinberg and Richard
S. Newfarmer).
29. Act, supra note 2, §§ 303(b), 102(a), (b).
30. See supra text accompanying notes 9-23.
31. Act, supra note 2, § 303(b). The Act does not require of the United States a com-
plementary violation of its secrecy provisions.
32. 1982 Hearings, supra note 2, at 219 (statement of Feinberg and Newfarmer).
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economists suggest that it will generate considerably less than that
in new investment. A Treasury Department study of the domestic
investment tax credit found that, for every dollar of tax revenue
foregone, the credit generated only seventy-six cents of new invest-
ment within the United States. ss Investment generated by the tax
credit in the Caribbean and Central America could be much lower
than that, owing partly to investor perceptions of the economic in-
stability of the area, and largely to the depressed United States
economy, which makes it difficult for United States businesses to
extend their investments in any region.34 "In the foreseeable fu-
ture, U.S. investors in many countries will probably invest only the
amount absolutely necessary to maintain their ongoing plant and
equipment. Thus, they will receive a windfall gain at the taxpayers'
expense,"3 5 since they will receive a tax credit for investments that,
in all likelihood, they would have made had the tax credit provi-
sion not existed. The countries of the Caribbean Basin region will
be no better off than had an investment tax credit not been
proposed.
To the extent that enactment of the investment tax credit has
an effect on Caribbean and Central American economies, that ef-
fect may well be adverse. Since the credit applies to machinery or
equipment, and not to labor costs, it will encourage investment in
capital-intensive industries. Such investment has the doubly nega-
tive effect on developing economies of producing insufficient em-
ployment while increasing import burdens.36 The credit is awarded
33. Id., citing Chirinko and Eisner, The Effects of Tax Policies on Investment, Office of
Tax Analysis, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury (Jan. 1981); see also 1982 Hearings, supra note 2,
at 72 (Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.).
34. "My misgivings about the practial results of these preferences are based on several
considerations. There already are considerable incentives for investment in the Caribbean
Basin countries. . . [inlcuding] the generous tax holidays U.S. corporations already can get
for investment in these countries. Who would want to invest today in El Salvador, Nicara-
gua, Guatemala, even with tax and trade incentives?" 1982 Hearings, supra note 2, at 193
(statement of Sidney Weintraub).
35. Feinberg & Newfarmer, The Caribbean Basin Initiative: A Bilateralist Gamble, 47
FOREIGN POL'Y 133, 137-38 (1982).
36. The administration claims that the tax credit will increase jobs in the region. 1982
Hearings, supra note 2, at 38 (statement of Marc Leland, Ass't. Sec. of Treas. for Int'l
Affairs). This view is disputed by economists, id. at 219 (statement of Feinberg and
Newfarmer); DeWitt, The Inter-American Development Bank and Policy Making in Costa
Rica, 15 J. DEVELOPING AREAS 67, 71 (1980). Economists also point out that the industries
created in response to the tax credit will increase the import burden of countries in the
region: "As the Basin countries develop as a reslut of new investments stimulated by the
CBI, their demand for imports for consumption and as inputs to their production processes
will grow, opening new markets for U.S. products," Hughes, supra note 7, at 20. See also
1983]
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to any United States investor in the Caribbean Basin, regardless of
the nature or location of his investment, making it a highly hap-
hazard way of channeling investment into the industries and loca-
tions in which investment is most needed by the developing econo-
mies of the region. Since the Act also provides duty-free trade to
those countries eligible for investment tax credits, it encourages
the tendency of United States investors to concentrate their for-
eign investment in the export sector of host countries. The Act
thus makes it even less likely that investments will be channeled
into infrastructure, import substitution industries, labor extensive
projects, or other areas in which investment might be useful to the
host country.
The presence of the investment tax credit as a significant com-
ponent of a program ostensibly aimed at reviving the economies of
the Caribbean region is but one of the indications that the purpose
of the CBI is the aggrandizement of United States business. The
credit will benefit United States investors while having little, if
any, positive impact on the economies of the region.
C. Duty-Free Trade
The Reagan administration has touted the provision of duty-
free trade for Caribbean Basin products exported to the United
States as the "centerpiece" of the CBI. If that is so, then the
program is weak at its center, for the economic impact on the Car-
ibbean region of the Act's free trade provisions is likely to be
slight. Administration officials admit that eighty-seven percent of
exports from the region to the United States already enter the
United States duty-free.3 8 Since the CBI will not afford duty-free
treatment to certain products, such as textiles and apparel, only
about five percent of the region's current exports to the United
States will be affected by the free trade grant.3 9 Estimates as to the
value of dutiable products currently exported to the United States,
Business Week, Mar. 15, 1982, quoted in 1982 Hearings, supra note 2, at 201: "A sad exam-
ple of what can go wrong is Puerto Rico: For 30 years the island has used lavish tax incen-
tives to lure mainland investors. But too many of the factories it attracted have been capital
intensive and have created few jobs."
37. The Caribbean Basin Initiative's "centerpiece is the offer of one-way free trade."
Message to Congress, supra note 5, at 324. See also OAS Speech, supra note 3, at 220;
SPECIAL REPORT No. 97, supra note 22, at 1; Hughes, supro note 7, at 18.
38. 1981 Hearings, supra note 1, at 170 (statement of Lande); OAS Speech, supra note
3, at 220.
39. 1982 Hearings, supra note 2, at 215 (statements of Feinberg and Newfarmer).
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which would enter the United States duty-free under the CBI
range from $469 million to $800 million.40 For most dutiable prod-
ucts from the region, tariffs average only four to five percent.41
Most major Caribbean and Central American agricultural and
other export products, with the exception of petroleum, currently
enter the United States duty-free, either under the most favored
nation provisions of existing trade agreements or under the Gener-
alized System of Preferences (GSP).4 ' To qualify for GSP duty-
free treatment, a product must be on the GSP list, must have had
no less than thirty-five percent of its value contributed by the
source country, and must be from a country whose exports of the
product to the United States do not exceed GSP competitive need
limitations. In most cases, exports to the United States from Car-
ibbean and Central American countries qualify for GSP duty-free
treatment because annual exports from each country are suffi-
ciently small both in dollar value and as a proportion of total world
exports to the United States so as not to exceed GSP competitive
need limitations.43 Sugar from the Dominican Republic, Guatemala
and Panama is subject to duty, however, because the annual sugar
exports of each country to the United States are in excess of GSP
dollar limits."
The Act would grant duty-free treatment, for a twelve-year
period, to all Caribbean Basin products, except textiles and ap-
parel items, imported directly into the United States from qualify-
ing Caribbean and Central American countries. 45 To be deemed a
40. 1982 Hearings, supra note 28, at multilith 8 (Table 1), (statement of Feinberg and
Newfarmer); Weintraub, The Caribbean Basin Initiative: A Flawed Model, 47 FOREIGN
POL'Y 128, 129 (1982); Hughes, supra note 7, at 20. These estimates are based on exports
from the Caribbean Basin to the United States in 1980, and do not take into account in-
creased production and export activity that might occur as a consequence of the Caribbean
Basin program.
41. 1981 Hearings, supra note 1, at 165 (statement of Lande).
42. Id., at 170-71 (Dep't of Commerce table). In addition, a small proportion of Carib-
bean Basin exports to the United States are afforded duty-free treatment under other provi-
sions, such as Tariff Code, § 807, which admits into the United States free of all duties,
except on the value added in the host country, the products of assembly industries using
U.S. components.
43. Weinbtraub, supra note 40, at 129.
44. Id.
45. Act, supra note 2, §§ 103(a), 103(b), 105. Although textiles and apparel will not
receive duty-free treatment under the Act, the Reagan administration has stated that it
intends to raise the quotas on the import of textiles and apparel items from the Caribbean
countries into the United States. Since the administration has also promised domestic man-
ufacturers that it "will continue to seek tighter limits on import growth," the increases in
Caribbean Basin quotas will be at the expense of other suppliers, probably Singapore, Tai-
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Caribbean Basin product for purposes of the duty-free provisions
of the Act, an article must have received at least twenty-five per-
cent of its value (calculated as the sum of the cost or value of
materials plus the direct costs of processing operations) in one or
more qualifying Caribbean Basin countries."e Thus, the Act would
expand the number of Caribbean Basin products receiving duty-
free treatment by adding products not now on the GSP list,"7 by
abrogating the GSP competitive need test and by lowering the
GSP local source requirement.48
Sugar, the most important export product of many Caribbean
countries, 49 will be subject to special treatment under the Act be-
cause United States sugar producers have organized to deprive im-
ported sugar of its competitive position in United States markets.
Smaller producers in the Caribbean region currently have duty-
free access to United States markets. While the Act would not al-
ter their position, it would improve the position of the Dominican
Republic, Guatamala and Panama, which are currently the region's
largest exporters of sugar to the United States and currently sub-
ject to tariffs. As submitted to Congress, the Act would afford
duty-free treatment for sugar from these three countries, but only
for so long as each limits the quantity of its exports of sugar to the
United States to within roughly ten percent of current levels.60 It is
not clear, however, whether these provisions of the Act will survive
wan and South Korea. SPECIAL REPORT No. 97, supra note 22, at 4-5; 1982 Hearings, supra
note 2, at 194 (statement of Weintraub).
46. In calculating the proportion of an article's value attributable to Caribbean Basin
countries, value added in Puerto Rico or the U.S. Virgin Islands may be included. Act,
supra note 2, § 103(a).
47. Products from the Caribbean and Central America, which are currently subject to
duties and which would be admitted duty-free under the Caribbean Basin program, include
rum, tobacco and tobacco products, some fresh fruits and vegetables, pharmaceuticals,
leather goods, baseball equipment, and electrical and electronic equipment. Weintraub,
supra note 40, at 129. Current imports of these products into the United States are esti-
mated to be between $460 million and $800 million. Id.
48. Feinberg and Newfarmer estimate that "the easing of the GSP requirements to
qualify for duty-free entry from 35% ...to 25%" combined with the lifting of the GSP
competitive need test for Caribbean Basin products, "may produce another $32 million of
new exports." 1982 Hearings, supra note 2, at 217.
49. STAFF OF HousE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON THE
EASTERN CARIBBEAN 1 (Comm. Print 1982). [hereinafter cited as EASTERN CARIBBEAN
REPORT].
50. Act, supra note 2, § 103(c). 1982 Hearings, supra note 2, at 217 (statement of Fein-
berg and Newfarmer). Major sugar importers, although exempt from duties, would still be
subject to price stabilization fees assessed against imported sugar to make its cost equal to
that of domestically produced sugar.
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the recent imposition by the United States, at the behest of do-
mestic sugar producers, of stringent quotas on sugar imports."1
Only those countries that qualify for beneficiary country sta-
tus under the Act will be eligible for duty-free treatment.52 Thus,
the grant of free trade is not, as the Reagan administration de-
scribes it, designed merely "to provide the most favorable access
possible for exports from the basin." It is intended, in part, as an
incentive to cajole Caribbean and Central American countries into
adopting policies congruent with the economic and security inter-
ests of the United States. Whether the Act will succeed in this aim
depends, to a great extent, on the degree to which countries in the
region believe that the free trade provisions will be so meaningful
to them as to make it worthwhile to seek beneficiary status.
For most countries in the Caribbean and Central America, it is
unlikely that the benefits to be gained from increased free trade
with the United States would be appreciable. The economic advan-
tages to be gained by the reduction of tariffs on products currently
being exported are, as noted above, not major, so long as exports of
these products remain near current levels." Free trade could be
advantageous to countries in the region if it leads to increased pro-
duction of current exports or to diversification into new products,
as proponents of the Act suggest will occur.55 It has been calcu-
lated, however, that new and increased production will generate
additional export earnings for the entire Caribbean Basin region of
no more than forty million dollars in the first year of the Act's
operation (constituting only one percent of the total 1980 exports
from the region) rising to a high of only one hundred million dol-
lars (or three percent of total 1980 exports) by the third and fourth
years."
51. Weintraub, supra note 40, at 128.
52. Act, supra note 2, § 103(a).
53. SPEciA REPORT No. 97, supra note 22, at 4.
54. See supra text accompanying notes 39-44.
55. SPECIAL REPORT No. 97, supra note 22, at 4; 1981 Hearings, supra note 1, at 165
(statement of Lande).
56. 1982 Hearings, supra note 2, at 218. The authors note that the extent of new and
increased production as a result of duty-free treatment will depend on three additional vari-
ables: whether Caribbean and Central American economies will be capable of increasing
production levels; whether the U.S. or international markets will improve sufficiently to sup-
port increasing imports; and whether U.S. consumers will purchase the new output. The
latter is a factor both of shifting consumer preferences to Caribbean Basin products and of
increasing consumer demand. For many products that the Caribbean Basin produces or
could, produce, U.S. consumer demand is relatively inelastic so that the small decrease in
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What the United States can bestow on its neighbors it can also
take away. The promise of free trade in the Act is hedged with
provisions for setting quotas or re-instituting tariffs at any sign
that the market for competitive United States products is weaken-
ing.6 7 Labor and industry lobbies in the United States which sup-
port protective tariffs on competitive foreign imports are very in-
fluential. Congress has already been induced to limit sugar imports
to an extent likely to undermine the effectiveness of the CBI in
that area, and it is likely that other products important to the Car-
ibbean Basin region will be excised from the Act's duty-free provi-
sions as well.58
Even if the free trade provisions live up to their promise of
increasing the market for Caribbean Basin exports and providing
Caribbean Basin countries with additional foreign currency reve-
nues, their overall effect might nonetheless not be in the best in-
terests of the governments and people in the region. Free trade will
encourage the expansion of export industries, most of which func-
tion only as last-stage assembly or components plants, 6s at the ex-
pense of the domestic market. Free trade will accelerate the con-
version of farms, producing foodstuffs for local consumption, into
agribusinesses producing crops for export.0 The free trade provi-
consumer prices caused by the tariff reductions would not be sufficient to compel consumers
to purchase the product. Id. at 217. Compare id. at 200 (statement of Weintraub) with id. at
205-06 (statement of William R. Cline). Some economists, as well as labor leaders and do-
mestic producers, have attempted to remind Congress that tariffs serve a purpose that the
Act attempts to undermine: "These duties exist . . . to protect some U.S. producer or
worker, or one in Puerto Rico or the U.S. Virgin Islands." 1982 Hearings, supra note 2, at
193 (statement of Weintraub). See also id. at 176 (statement of Dr. Rudolph A. Oswald,
AFL-CIO).
57. Act, supra note 2, at § 103(d), (e). In addition, § 104(b) permits the re-institution of
duties on imports of Caribbean rum into the United States if rum excise taxes payable to
Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands fall below the amounts that would have been paya-
ble to them had the duty free provisions not been in effect. See also Id. § 302.
58. Weintraub, supra note 40 at 129. The version of the Act that was passed by the
House of Representatives on December 19, 1982 would have removed from the Act's duty-
free treatment all textiles, apparel, footwear, handbags, petroleum products, tuna fish, and
leather clothing. Unsuccessful attempts were also made to limit duty-free treatment of rum,
tobacco and tobacco products. N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1982, at D7.
59. This tendency will be accentuated by the Act's provision that only twenty-five per-
cent of the value of exported products need be contributed by the source country. Act,
supra note 2, at 103(a).
60. The growth of export-oriented agriculture, combined with population growth and
urbanization, has forced the countries of the Caribbean, which as recently as 1945 were
agriculturally self-sufficient, to import rice and other basic foodstuffs. Proceedings of the
Conference on Environmental Management and Economic Growth in the Smaller Caribbean
Islands 7, 91. (W.S. Belier ed. Sept. 17-21, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Conference].
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sions, linked as they are to the investment tax credit, will assist
United States businesses more than they will assist Caribbean Ba-
sin countries. 1 A United States company can move plant and
equipment into the area, get the benefit of the tax credit to offset
the costs of doing so, produce goods for duty-free entry into the
United States market, and close down the plant, repatriating all
profits and assets, when the Act's twelve-year free trade period
expires.
D. Economic Assistance
In addition to the investment tax credit and duty-free trade,
the Act authorizes the appropriation of $350 million for fiscal year
1982 to fund direct economic assistance to certain Caribbean and
Central American countries."' Added to funds previously appropri-
ated, this would increase United States bilateral economic assis-
tance to countries in the region to a total of $824.6 million in fiscal
year 1982.63 The Reagan administration has stated that it will re-
quest an appropriation of $664.5 million for fiscal year 1983.4
The administration has announced numerous plans for utiliza-
tion of the $350 million appropriation, all of which involve support
61. A spokesperson for the U.S. Department of Commerce has stated, "while the CBI is
designed to help beneficiary countries expand their export earnings and stimulate their de-
velopment, the potential benefits of the CBI to the U.S. private sector also are significant.
In 1981, the United States exported $6.5 billion worth of products to the Basin. In almost
every Caribbean Basin country, the United States is the principal supplier of imports, in
most cases capturing more than twenty-five percent of the total import market. Currently,
our major exports to the Caribbean Basin are transportation equipment, electrical and in-
dustrial machinery, chemicals and manufactured goods. As the Basin countries develop as a
result of new investments stimulated by the CBI, their demand for imports for consumption
and as inputs to their production processes "will grow, opening new markets for U.S. prod-
ucts . . . An additional potential benefit to the U.S. private sector is that the guaranteed
duty-free access to the U.S. market, the investment tax incentive, and the other trade and
investment measures in the CBI will make U.S. direct investment in the Basin countries
more profitable." Hughes, The Caribbean Basin Economic Renewal: New Opportunities for
American Business, Bus. AM, Mar. 8, 1982 at 18, 20. See also Manley, Reagan's Free Trade
Offer to Sham Democracies, SouTH, May 1982 at 22.
62. Act, supra note 22, § 201. Recipient countries and organizations, and the amount
each is to receive, are listed in Message to Congress, supra note 5, at 325, and discussed
infra at text accompanying notes 97-98.
63. SPECIAL REPORT No. 97, supra note 22, at 2. In fiscal year 1981, economic assistance
to countries in the Caribbean Basin region totaled $419.6 million. Id.
64. The Reagan administration has not explained why the appropriation requested for
1983 will be $160.1 million less than the total for 1982 (including CBI), nor why the propor-
tions allocated to the Economic Support Fund will be so much higher in 1982 than in 1983:
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for the private sector."5 Even the administration's promise that the
primary use of the funds will be balance of payments support is
subsumed by its interest in protecting private investment. Sub-
stantial infusions of foreign exchange would greatly benefit most
Caribbean and Central American countries. Depletion of their for-
eign exchange reserves - caused by the rising costs of needed im-
ports such as oil and manufactured goods, declining prices for ex-
ports, and high interest rates on overseas loans - is a major
reason for the economic problems they are experiencing."6
The Reagan administration has intimated that "a major ob-
jective of the aid component of the CBI will be . . . large and im-
mediate infusions of foreign exchange for balance of payments sup-
port. '67 However, the administration does not, in fact, intend to
assist countries in the region to repay foreign debt, to pay for pub-
lic-sector imports, or otherwise to decrease the region's outstand-
ing foreign exchange deficit. If this were the administration's in-
tent, the proposed aid appropriation would have been much larger,
in order to bridge the region's four billion dollar foreign exchange
shortfall. s Instead, the administration has decided that it will pro-
vide foreign exchange assistance by using aid funds "primarily to
finance private-sector imports."' The result of this policy will be
to enabel private investors in the region to import goods and
Assistance Category 1982 (including CBI) 1983 (Proposed)
Development Assistance $211.3M $217.6M
Economic Support Fund 490.OM 326.OM
Food Aid 123.2M 120.9M
Totals $824.5M $664.5M
Source: SPEcIAL REPORT No. 97, supra note 22, at 2.
65. McPherson, supra note 5. See also SpEciAL REPORT No. 97, supra note 22, at 6;
OAS Speech, supra note 3, at 220.
66. Economic and Political Future of the Caribbean: Hearings before the Subcomm.
on Inter-American Affairs of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-
18 (1979) (statement of John A. Bushnell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs); Conference, supra note 60, at 89, 92; 1981 EASTERN CARIBBEAN REPORT,
supra note 49, at 144, 153-54. Hearings, supra note 1, at 21-22 (statement of J. I. Domin-
guez, Harvard University).
67. McPherson, supra note 5, at 4; 1982 Hearings, supra note 2, at 49 (statement of
McPherson).
68. It has been estimated that the region's "current-account deficit (the difference be-
tween exports and imports, and between the payments made to external investors and re-
ceipts from workers' remittances)" is in the neighborhood of four billion dollars, and that
the "proposed emergency supplemental of $350 million will cover only about nine percent of
projected external financing needs." 1982 Hearings, supra note 2, at 220 (statement of Fein-
berg and Newfarmer); 201 (statement of Weintraub).
69. SPEcIAL REPORT No. 97, supra note 22, at 6.
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equipment that the foreign exchange deficit of the country in
which they are operating would otherwise preclude them from
purchasing. This policy will lead to increasing dependence upon
imports, exacerbating the foreign exchange problems that the Act
purports to solve.
The President has explained that the aid apropriation is gen-
erally intended to generate and support private investment in re-
cipient countries in order to "foster the spirit of enterprise neces-
sary to take advantage of the trade and investment portions of the
program. "70 Appropriated funds will be channeled to recipients
through the Economic Support Fund (ESF), '7 1 a program which is
administered by the United States Agency for International Devel-
opment (AID). ESF "provides loans and grants to selected coun-
tries of special political and security interest to the United
States. . . . Recipients purchase goods and services from U.S. in-
stitutions and firms."7 ' An AID spokesman has explained that the
creation of programs to assist the private sector will not violate the
Congressional mandate that AID's programs focus on the needs of
the poor.73 ESF assistance monies will be used "primarily to en-
courage the allocation of resources toward private-sector imports
of raw materials and intermediate goods, thus facilitating domestic
production and employment without a further deterioration in the
balance of payments. '7 4 A Bureau for Private Enterprise has been
created within AID to "provide technical assistance to host coun-
try governments, providing policy guidance and, where required
and requested, recommending changes to improve the investment
'climate' of the host country .... 1"75
The programs to which ESF funds will be devoted are of two
kinds: some will aim at altering recipient countries' policies and
procedures so as to make each country more hospitable to foreign
investment; others will provide direct assistance to increase the ef-
ficiency and profitability of private-sector investments. Thus, AID
expects that the ESF funds will be used in programs such as "a
70. OAS Speech, supra note 3, at 220.
71. Act, supra note 2, § 201.
72. U.S. Agency for International Development, Facts About AID, 5 AGENDA (inside
front cover) (1982).
73. McPherson, supra note 5, at 4.
74. Although total direct economic assistance to countries in the region will increase as
a result of the CBI, assistance for development projects and social services will be less in
1983 than it was in 1982. 1982 Hearings, supra note 2, at 201 (statement of McPherson).
75. McPherson, supra note 5, at 4.
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sector structural adjustment program to support the identification
and implementation of needed policy changes in the productive
sectors of the economy;" vocational training "to provide the human
resources needed by a growing industrial sector;" an inter-island
shipping and marketing project "with private sector involvement;"
research on "non-traditional export crops and a loan fund to en-
courage production and export of these crops by the private sec-
tors;" support for "crop diversification and agribusiness enter-
prises;" and, the creation of loan funds for small businesses and
export industries.7 6
While all of these programs will benefit United States inves-
tors by creating conditions amenable to private investment, some
of the ESF supported programs are aimed directly at assisting
United States businesses in the Caribbean Basin region. "AID will
provide the assistance needed to bring together investors, both
from the United States and Caribbean Basin countries, who are
interested in establishing business ventures in the Basin."" Direct
financial support for such ventures will be provided by AID, as
well as by other United States agencies.
7 8
To achieve the goal of making the Caribbean and Central
America safe for investment from the United States, AID's $350
million requested appropriation will be supplemented by the funds
and activities of other United States government agencies and
United States business entities, which will be expected to offer to
countries in the region "programs to facilitate adjustments to
greater competition and production in agriculture and industry. 7 9
To demonstrate the commitment to the private sector of all of the
agencies of the United States government, President Reagan has
announced, for example, that "the Peace Corps already has 861
volunteers in Caribbean Basin countries, and will give special em-
phasis to recruiting volunteers with skills in developing local enter-
prise."'8 0 However, only limited assistance can be expected from
certain United States government agencies, including those whose
nominal purpose is to support private foreign investment. Neither
the Export-Import Bank nor the Overseas Private Investment Cor-
76. Id. at 4-5. See also 1981 Hearings, supra note 1, at 140 (statement of Enders), and
at 154-159 (statement of Bolton); 1982 Hearings, supra note 2, at 49-51 (statement of
McPherson).
77. McPherson, supra note 5, at 4; see also SPEcIAL REPORT No. 97, supra note 22, at 7.
78. McPherson, supra note 5, at 5.
79. OAS Speech, supra note 3, at 220. See also Johnson, supra note 7, at 120-21.
80. Id.
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poration will finance or insure investors at significant levels in
most Central American countries, including El Salvador, because
the charters of both agencies preclude their operation in countries
that present high credit risks. 1
Although the Reagan administration has announced that it in-
tends the Caribbean Basin program to have multilateral support,8
concurrent with the increase of bilateral United States aid to coun-
tries in the Caribbean and Central America, the administration is
decreasing its commitment to multilateral agencies, such as the In-
ternational Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World
Bank), the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Caribbean
Development Bank. These agencies are considered unsuitable by
the Reagan administration because they will not renege on obliga-
tions to Nicaragua and Grenada, they are not unfailing supporters
of United States business interests, and their loans and grants are
as likely to be channeled into public sector improvements and so-
cial services as to the private sector. However, because they pro-
mote regional integration, as well as infrastructure and basic needs
projects, and because they are, at least to some extent, responsive
to the needs of donee countries, grants by the United States to
these agencies would be more useful to Caribbean Basin countries,
and more likely to promote economic development, than will be
the bilateral aid envisioned by the CBI8 3
I1. THE CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
A. Historical Aspects
The Caribbean Basin Initiative is designed to protect not only
the economic interests of United States investors in the Caribbean
region, but the political and military interests of the United States
as well. As an economic construct, the CBI has little meaning. The
countries of Central America are so different in history, politics,
81. Feinberg & Newfarmer, supra note 35, at 135; 1982 Hearings, supra note 2, at 214
(statement of Feinberg & Newfarmer). The administration has attempted to obscure this
flaw in its strategy of uniting all agencies behind the CBI by announcing that these agencies
"will expand protection, where [their] . . . criteria allow .... " Message to Congress, supra
note 5, at 326. See also SPECIAL REPORT No. 97, supra note 22, at 5, 8.
82. OAS Speech, supra note 3, at 220; Message to Congress, supra note 5, at 324; SPE-
CLL REPORT No. 97, supra note 22, at 8.
83. Feinberg & Newfarmer, supra note 35 at 8; 1982 Hearings, supra note 2, at 60
(Senator John Glenn), 65 (statement of McPherson), 222 (statement of Feinberg &
Newfarmer).
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and economics from those of the Caribbean as to render ludicrous
their linkage in a single economic program. 4 As a matter of United
States national security interests, however, successive United
States governments have viewed the Caribbean Sea and the Pan-
ama Canal as defensive positions to be protected by uniting the
countries around the perimeters of the Caribbean in one package:
The region forms the third border of the United States, contains
vital sea lanes through which three-quarters of our oil imports
must flow, is an important market for U.S. exports, and is our
second largest source of illegal immigration. 5
The United States engaged in almost two hundred military actions
abroad from 1798 to 1980 without official declarations of war. Of
these, eighty-one took place in the Caribbean, none south of the
Panama Canal.8
In protecting what the United States government perceives to
be its self-interest, under the guise of assisting its southern neigh-
bors, the CBI is merely a continuation of the tradition of United
States hegemony in the western hemisphere, begun in 1823 with
the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine:87
What happens everywhere in the Americas affects us in this
84. "fT]here exist important differences between these two regions. Despite divergent
colonial traditions, the insular territories of the Caribbean share social, ethnic, economic,
and cultural patterns. They also share historical relationships with the United States and
other Western powers that differ sharply from those in Central America .... Most are very
closely tied to the United States through extensive economic, cultural, and demographic
interaction. Satellites in search of an orbit, they require a regularized pattern of interaction
with a metropolitan power. The Central American countries, in contrast, are much more
autonomous, both economically and politically. Tangible U.S. interests in Central America
are scant, and U.S. influence and leverage are correspondingly lower than in the Caribbean.
U.S. policies towards the two regions should reflect those differences." Lowenthal, The Car-
ibbean Basin Initiative: Misplaced Emphasis, 47 FoREIGN POL'y 114, 116-17 (1982) fherein-
after cited as Misplaced Emphasis]. See also 1981 Hearings, supra note 1, at 2 (statement
of Rep. Mervyn M. Dymally, Calif.), 4-5 (statement of J. I. Dominguez, Harvard University);
J. DOMINGUEZ, U.S. INTERESTS AND POLICIES IN THE CARIBBEAN AND CENTRAL AMERICA 1-2
(1982); Lowenthal, The United States and the Caribbean in the 1980's, POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE: SELECTED ISSUES FOR U.S. POLICY, SELECTED ESSAYS PREPARED
FOR THE USE OF THE SUBCOMM. ON INT'L TRADE, FINANCE, AND SECURITY ECONOMICS OF THE
JoINT ECONOMIC COMM., 97TH CONG., 1ST SEss. 44, 46 (1981) [hereinafter cited as POLITICAL
ECONOMY].
85. SPECIAL REPORT No. 97, supra note 22, at 1; see also Lowenthal in POLITICAL ECON-
OMY, supra note 84, at 47-48; 1982 Hearings, supra note 2, at 30 (Senator Charles H. Percy).
86. J. MARTIN, U.S. POLICY IN THE CARIBBEAN 22-23 (1978).
87. J. MARTIN, supra note 86; J. DOMINGUEZ, supra note 84, at 2-3, 29-34; Carto, The
Monroe Doctrine in the 1980's: International Law, Unilateral Policy or Atavistic Anachro-
nism, 13 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 203, 225, 228 (1981).
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country. In that very real sense, we share a common destiny.
We, the peoples of the Americas have much more in common
than geographical proximity. For over 400 years our peoples
have shared the dangers and dreams of building a new
world .... In the commitment to freedom and independence
the peoples of this hemisphere are one. In this profound sense,
we are all Americans. Our principles are rooted in self-govern-
ment and non-intervention. . . .I have always believed that this
hemisphere was a special place with a special destiny. I believe
we are destined to be the beacon of hope for all mankind. With
God's help we can make it so; we can create a peaceful, free and
prospering hemisphere based on our shared ideals and reaching
from pole to pole of what we proudly call the New World. 88
The concepts which motivated this speech - that the countries of
the western hemisphere are linked, that the intervention of author-
ity or ideology from outside the hemisphere will not be tolerated
by the United States, that the New World is a special place, that
the United States knows what is best for the rest of the hemi-
sphere-and the very phrases in which these ideas are articulated
might have been stated by President Monroe, by Theodore
Roosevelt in 1904, by Woodrow Wilson in 1916, by Franklin Del-
ano Roosevelt in the 1930's, or by John F. Kennedy in 1961."1 In
fact, the speech was delivered by President Reagan to the Organi-
zation of American States on February 24, 1982, announcing the
Caribbean Basin Initiative.
For two hundred years, the United States government has
feared the invasion of alien economic or ideological principles, and
has imagined that the first breach in its defenses would be the en-
try of extra-hemispheric influence or power into one of the Central
American or Caribbean countries. Monroe feared England, France
and Spain; "Kaiserism was to Theodore Roosevelt, Taft and Wil-
son what communism would be to Eisenhower, Kennedy and John-
son"9 and to Reagan, as well. The Central American and Carib-
bean policy of the United States has seldom grown out of the
needs or interests of those countries; it has always been a response
to the larger strategic concerns of the United States.
88. OAS Speech, supra note 3, at 217-18, 223.
89. J. MARTIN, supra note 86, at 13, 18, 21, 51; see also Lowenthal in POLITICAL ECON-
OMY, supra note 84, at 48.
90. J. MARTIN, supra note 86, at 23.
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B. Beneficiary and Recipient Countries
The economic and national security interests of the United
States in the Caribbean Basin are inextricably intertwined. The
United States government sends troops, as well as military and
financial assistance, to governments of the region because the Ba-
sin is economically significant to the United States.9 Conversely,
so long as countries in the region are economically dependent upon
United States trade, investment, and assistance, it is thought that
such countries will be unlikely to endanger United States security.
Operating from these premises, the CBI attempts to achieve three
interrelated ends: first, it promotes expanded economic linkages
between the United States and countries in the region, increasing
their dependency on the United States; second, it proffers eco-
nomic rewards to those Caribbean Basin countries that have sup-
ported United States policies, ensuring their continuing support;
and, third, it isolates from economic benefits those countries that
are considered threats to United States security, weakening their
economies and, the administration hopes, their governments.
The CBI attempts to promote the economic dependency of
countries in the region on the United States by prompting such
countries to accept additional United States investment and to in-
crease their trade with the United States. Decisions by the admin-
istration as to which countries will be granted beneficiary country
status, entitling them to duty-free trade and to the benefits accru-
ing from the investment tax credit, as well as the administration's
decisions as to which countries will receive ESF economic assis-
tance, will be made, in large part, on the basis of political and na-
tional security considerations, rewarding supporters of the United
States and penalizing those who refuse to recognize United States
domination of the region.
The Act authorizes the President to deny beneficiary country
status not only to those countries that have neglected to support
91. In 1981, the United States imported products valued at $9.9 billion from the Carib-
bean Basin region and supplied exports of $6.5 billion to countries in the area. Hughes,
supra note 7, at 20. In addition, "not counting Puerto Rico, the United States has over $4.3
billion in direct private investment in the region (of which over $1.2 billion took place in the
last decade); twenty-five percent of U.S. worldwide investments protected by the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) are in the Caribbean. More than seventy-five per-
cent of the bauxite the United States currently imports (more than half of our total con-
sumption) comes from the Caribbean and about $4 billion of refined petroleum products."
Lowenthal in POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 84, at 52. See also 1981 Hearings, supra note
1, at 21-22, 136-39, 160-62, 170-71.
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United States business interests, as described above,"2 but also to
any country "if such country is a Communist country."' Adminis-
tration officials intend to invoke this provision or other provisions
of the Act in order to deny beneficiary country status to Cuba,
Nicaragua and Grenada.94 The exclusion of these nations from the
CBI has been criticized both by commentators95 and by countries96
on the basis that it injects the Reagan administration's animosity
towards the Soviet Union into a program ostensibly aimed only at
assisting countries in the western hemisphere to solve their eco-
nomic problems.
The Reagan administration patently believes that it knows "a
Communist country" when it sees one, since no definition of the
term appears in the Act. The policies of the governments of Nica-
ragua, Cuba and Grenada, both domestically and in their relations
with the United States and the Soviet Union, are sufficiently dis-
tinguishable, however, as to suggest an elastic character to the
term.
At the same time that the Act will be used to deny the eco-
nomic benefits of the CBI to those countries considered foes by the
Reagan administration, it is the intention of the administration to
use the Act to support the national security interests of the United
States in the Caribbean and Central American regions by re-
warding and sustaining governments deemed strategically useful.
Recipients of the $350 million in aid funds authorized by the Act
have already been determined. The choices underline the essential
political nature of the CBI.97 Economic assistance funds are to be
92. See supra text accompanying notes 12-23.
93. Act, supra note 2, § 102(b)(1). Administration officials have stated that although
the Act's anti-communism provision applies only to Cuba; Nicaragua and Grenada are also
likely to be excluded from beneficiary country status. 1982 Hearings, supra note 2, at 68
(statement of Stoessel) and 72 (statement of Brock).
94. 1981 Hearings, supra note 1, at 138, 172 (statement of Enders); Misplaced Empha-
sis, supra note 84, at 115-16; 1982 Hearings, supra note 2, at 68, 71-72 (statement of Brock).
95. Misplaced Emphasis, supra note 84, at 115; Weintraub, supra note 40, at 128;
Feinberg & Newfarmer, supra note 35, at 134; 1982 Hearings, supra note 2, at 86-87 (Sena-
tor Paul E. Tsongas).
96. Foreign ministers of Canada, Mexico and Venezuela, all of which had been expected
by the Reagan administration to support the Caribbean Basin program, expressed reserva-
tions because of its linkage of economic assistance to "military considerations" and "politi-
cal preconditions." Council on Hemispheric Affairs, The Caribbean Basin: More "Security"
Won't Make it Secure 2-3. (Feb. 18, 1982) (mimeo).
97. Recipient countries and organizations, and the amount each is to receive, are listed
in Message to Congress, supra note 5, at 3. Deputy Secretary of State Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.
explains that the purpose of the CBI is "to help the small and troubled countries of the
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distributed on the basis neither of need nor of ability to make use
of the funds.98 Political and economic allies of the current United
States administration will receive grants, while countries that are
opposed, neutral or considered insufficiently important to these
policies will receive little or nothing.
The Central American countries and organizations will receive
$245 million (close to two-thirds of the total), while all Caribbean
countries together will receive only $105 million, less than the
grant to El Salvador alone. This demonstrates that access to the
Panama Canal, and, consequently, the political and economic isola-
tion of Nicaragua, are major concerns animating the Caribbean Ba-
sin policy. Since El Salvador, which is neither on the Caribbean
nor renowned for its humanitarian ideals and peaceful ways, will
receive $128 million, the largest single bequest, one might suspect
that support for the current El Salvador regime against its rebel
forces is the primary purpose behind the Caribbean Basin pro-
gram. With Honduras and Costa Rica, also neighbors of Nicaragua,
slated to receive thirty-five million dollars and seventy million dol-
lars, respectively, however, one might instead conclude that the
Act is intended to surround and isolate Nicaragua, which is point-
edly excluded from the list of recipient nations.
Caribbean countries are not entirely overlooked. Jamaica will
receive fifty million dollars, and the Dominican Republic is to be
granted forty million dollars. Each of these countries has recently
shown itself willing to adopt economic and political policies accept-
able to the United States. The countries and colonies of the East-
ern Caribbean are deemed unimportant to United States interests,
however. Although in need of economic assistance and likely to
utilize it productively, they will receive an aggregate of only ten
Caribbean Basin. .. to give them hope in their future, with Western values as the founda-
tion for their freedom and independence." 1982 Hearings, supra note 2, at 44.
98. Several commentators have noted that the political situation in certain Central
American countries, including Honduras and El Salvador, make these countries so volatile
that their ability to use economic assistance in any way useful to their people is very un-
likely. Their capacity to utilize funds to attract private investment, which is the aim of the
Caribbean Basin program, is almost nonexistent. Yet these countries are to receive dispro-
portionately large grants. Misplaced Emphasis, supra note 84, at 115-16, Feinberg &
Newfarmer, supra note 35, at 134-35; Manley, supra note 61; 1982 Hearings, supra note 2,
at 53-54 (Senator Edward Zorinsky). Criticism has also been leveled at the administration
because it has earmarked five million dollars of CBI direct assistance funds for Haiti: "Year
after year, the United States pours our taxpayers' hard-earned dollars into Haiti, where
government corruption and mismanagement leave Haiti the poorest nation in the Hemi-
sphere." Id. at 54 (Senator Edward Zorinsky).
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million dollars. Cuba and Grenada are to receive nothing.
C. Military Assistance
The Reagan administration intends to request an appropria-
tion of up to sixty million dollars for military assistance to coun-
tries of the Caribbean and Central America in connection with the
Caribbean Basin program. The request, has been separated from
assistance funds requested under the Act.'9 Military assistance
amounts already authorized by Congress and allocated to the Car-
ibbean and Central America, for fiscal year 1982, total $112.1 mil-
lion, of which $81 million is for El Salvador.'00 No announcement
has as yet been made as to the proposed division by country of the
additional amount to be requested.
The inclusion of a military component in a program otherwise
devoted to economic assistance demonstrates that the CBI was not
formulated primarily to help countries in the region but, in the
words of Reagan administration officials, "to respond to the grow-
ing threat of Cuban and Soviet subversion in the Caribbean Ba-
sin."'"' The Reagan administration has tried, however, to convince
both Congress and the countries of the Caribbean Basin that eco-
nomic assistance is its major aim. No mention of military assis-
tance was made in the President's message to Congress, when the
Act was submitted,'0 2 although security issues were stressed, and
increased "security assistance" appropriations were announced in
the President's earlier speech introducing the Caribbean Basin
program to the Organization of American States.'03 A description
of the CBI, prepared by the United States Department of State,
omits from the published version a chapter on military assistance
that had been in earlier drafts.'"
Although the linkage of military assistance to the CBI empha-
sizes that the security of the United States is the program's first
imperative, the program is designed to serve the security needs of
99. EASTERN CARIBBEAN REPORT, supra note 49, at 19; SPEcxAL REPORT No. 97, supra
note 22, at 2; 1982 Hearings, supra note 2, at 54 (Senator Edward Zorinsky).
100. U.S. Dep't of State, Fact Sheet: Caribbean Basin Policy 36-37 (undated mimeo)
[hereinafter cited as U.S. Dep't of State, Fact Sheet].
101. Id. at 36.
102. Message to Congress, supra note 5.
103. OAS Speech, supra note 3, at 222.
104. Compare SPECIAL REPORT No. 97, supra note 22, at 2, which contains only fleeting
and inadvertent references to a military assistance appropriation, with U.S. Dep't of State,
Fact Sheet, supra note 100.
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the United States even without the military assistance component.
The program will increase the dependence of Caribbean and Cen-
tral American economies on the United States, will reward coun-
tries that behave as the United States wants them to behave, and
punish those that do not. The program will be pursued unilater-
ally, involving in the decisions and actions of the United States
neither multilateral agencies nor other donor nations, since their
participation might soften or deflect the national security policies
that lie at the heart of the program.105
IV. THE CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT
The Caribbean Basin Initiative will increase the economic de-
pendence of the region on the United States, but the program's
effects on economic development, if any, are likely to be adverse.
The CBI is more likely to exacerbate than to solve the problems
currently being experienced by the economies of the area.
The countries of the Caribbean and Central America are eco-
nomically underdeveloped, in large part, a result of their depen-
dence, "one of the legacies of the colonial past.""' None of the
countries of the region is economically self-sufficient. They are de-
pendent on the rest of the world, primarily on the United States,
not only as markets for their exports and as suppliers of imports,
105. Canada, Venezuela, and Mexico each contribute substantially, in direct and indi-
rect aid, as well as in trade and investment, to the countries of the Caribbean Basin. The
Reagan administration originally intended that the Caribbean Basin program be pursued
jointly by the United States and these three nations. When they objected to the political
and security aspects of the program, however, the United States chose to proceed unilater-
ally rather than to alter the program to meet their objections. SPECIAL REPORT No. 97, supra
note 22, at 9-10; 1981 Hearings, supra note 1, at 134-35 (statement of Enders); Council on
Hemispheric Affairs, supra note 96. The Reagan administration has attempted to minimize
these differences and to obscure the fact that Canada, Venezuela, and Mexico have refused
to join the United States program. In his message to Congress, for example, President Rea-
gan said, "The United States has been developing this program in close consultation with
the countries of the region and with other donor countries. Last July, we joined with Ca-
nada, Mexico, and Venezuela to launch a multilateral action program for the region. It was
agreed that each country would develop its own program but within a multilateral consulta-
tive framework .... The program I am presenting today is our contribution." Message to
Congress, supra note 5, at 324.
106. Conference, supra note 60, at 7. For a more thorough discussion of the relation-
ship of dependence to underdevelopment, see REAntNGs IN THlE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE
CARIBEAN (N. Girvan & 0. Jefferson ed. 1971); Dos Santos, The Structure of Dependence,
in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT 110 (C.K. Wilbur ed.
1973); O'Brien, A Critique of Latin American Theories of Dependence, in BEYOND THE SO-
CIOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT 8 (I. Oxaal, T. Barnett, D. Booth ed. 1975).
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but also "as providers of finance for private and government con-
sumption and investment expenditures. 1 0 7 Tourism and exports,
consisting almost entirely of primary agricultural and mineral
products, constitute the major part of their domestic production.
The region is dependent on imports to supply basic food and en-
ergy needs, as well as to provide most manufactured goods, includ-
ing capital equipment, machinery and spare parts, and consumer
products. A significant part of the revenue generated by the econo-
mies of these countries does not remain there, but is remitted over-
seas, primarily to the United States, in the form of payments for
imports, debt service payments, license fees, and remittances of
the profits and salaries of foreign investors and their expatriate
personnel. ' 08 As a result, countries of the region retain insufficient
funds to generate investment locally or to provide for the basic
needs of their populations.
As a consequence of dependence and the flight of capital, eco-
nomic growth does not lead to the development of integrated and
self-sustaining economies, even on the regional level. Capital re-
mains scarce: it has been estimated that, in the Caribbean, con-
sumption accounts for over ninety percent of gross domestic prod-
uct, and that more than fifty-seven percent of Caribbean
investment is financed by foreign sources. 109 As corporations take
quick profits on export crops, agriculture declines, and, as land is
diverted from food to export production, it becomes necessary to
import foods."10 Capital-intensive industries do not replace all jobs
lost in the agricultural sector, so wages remain low and unemploy-
ment high.' Unemployment would be even higher in the Carib-
bean if it were not for the high levels of migration from the Carib-
107. Conference, supra note 60, at 32. See also 1981 Hearings, supra note 1, at 50;
Lowenthal, in POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 84, at 52.
108. World Bank, World Development Report 150-53 (1979).
109. Conference, supra note 60, at 92. See also Lowenthal, in POLITICAL ECONOMY,
supra note 84, at 49. The flight of private domestic capital is a particularly pressing problem
for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. The political problems faced by these countries
have caused many to send capital overseas rather than invest it domestically. Studies spon-
sored by AID estimate that capital outflow from Central America surpassed five hundred
million dollars in each of 1979 and 1980. 1982 Hearings, supra note 2, at 213 (statement of
Feinberg and Newfarmer).
110. 1981 Hearings, supra note 1, at 57-58 (statement of R. Weisskopf, Iowa State Uni-
versity); Lowenthal in POITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 84, at 50.
111. Unemployment approaches forty percent in many Caribbean and Central Ameri-
can countries. Underemployment is also a problem. 1981 Hearings, supra note 1, at 57
(statement of Weisskopf). Lowenthal, in POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 84, at 49; Eastern
Caribbean Report, supra note 49, at 11-12.
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bean to the United States.112 The ultimate result of dependence,
for most of the people of the Caribbean and Central America, is
poverty and the ills associated with poverty-underemployment,
malnutrition, illiteracy and under-education, inadequate social ser-
vices, insufficient health care, and infant mortality.1
The adverse consequences generally associated with depen-
dence have been multiplied in recent years by the effect on Carib-
bean and Central American countries of the declining international
economy, caused by inflation, recession, and high interest rates in
the United States:
Shortages of foreign exchange is a major cause of the profound
economic crisis grioping the region. The cost of imported energy
has risen, whereas the prices of such key commodities as sugar,
coffee, bauxite and nickel [the region's major exports], have de-
clined. The drop in export prices in 1981 alone reduced the re-
gion's export earnings by over $485 million. 14
As an example of the effect on the region of rising import costs and
declining export prices, it has been pointed out that, in 1973, the
Dominican Republic's exports of sugar resulted in earnings of
twice the costs of imported oil, whereas in 1981, imported oil alone
cost the Dominican Republic seventy-five million dollars more
than its total income from sugar.1 At the same time, tourism, a
primary source of revenue for many Caribbean countries, has de-
112. It has been estimated that over four million persons born in the Caribbean have
migrated to the United States since World War II and that twenty percent of all living
Caribbean people reside in the United States at this time. Lowenthal, in POLrICAL ECON-
OMY, supra note 84, at 52. In 1980, one-sixth of the population of Barbados resided in the
United States, one-fifth of the Jamaican population, one-twelfth of Dominicans, one-tenth
of the population of Cuba, and forty percent of the Puerto Rican population. The Caribbean
accounts for seventeen and one-half percent of legal migration to the United States, and a
large proportion of illegal emigrants. J. DOMINGUEZ, supra note 84, at 6.
113. For example, in the smaller islands of the Eastern Caribbean infant mortality
reaches thirty-nine per thousand (compared to eighteen per thousand in the United States),
less than half the population of some islands has access to drinkable water, child malnutri-
tion ranges from an average of fourteen percent to highs of up to twenty-seven percent, and
adult illiteracy reaches twenty-four percent. Conference, supra note 60, at 89. Haiti, Domi-
nica, and Grenada are among the six countries with the lowest per capita gross national
product in the western hemisphere, but, even in the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico,
where per capita GNP is relatively high, income inequities cause poverty to be widespread.
Lowenthal, in POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 84, at 49; 1981 Hearings, supra note 1, at 48-
49 (statement of Weisskopf).
114. 1982 Hearings, supra note 2, at 221 (statement of Feinberg and Newfarmer). See
also Lowenthal, in POLrICAL ECONOMY, supra note 84, at 50, Eastern Caribbean Report,
supra note 49, at 144, 153-54; 1982 Hearings, supra note 2, at 37 (statement of Leland).
115. Lowenthal, in POLmCAL ECONOMY, supra note 84, at 51.
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clined, and political uncertainty has further disrupted the econo-
mies of El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala." 6 The effects of
the world economic situation on the dependent economies of the
Caribbean and Central America include "serious inflation, high un-
employment, declining gross domestic product growth, enormous
balance of payments deficits, and a pressing liquidity crisis.
' 1" 7
The solutions proposed by the CBI to the problems that de-
pendence has caused, however, would make the region increasingly
dependent. The program attempts to overcome the Caribbean Ba-
sin's economic problems by increasing foreign investment and
overseas trade. Although such a program may produce growth, it
will not produce development. The Reagan administration has
based its program for the economic recovery of the countries of the
Caribbean and Central America on two assumptions: first, that ec-
onomic growth, no matter what form it takes, will lead to develop-
ment, and second, that growth may be achieved most efficiently by
the private sector." 8 In consequence, the CBI provides for an in-
creasing role for foreign and domestic private investment in the
region and for the curtailment of domestic public sector economic
activity, except in support of private investors.
It has been the experience of the countries and colonies of
Central America and the Caribbean that, when dependence is the
116. 1982 Hearings, supra note 2, at 213 (statement of Feinberg and Newfarmer).
117. SPECIAL REPORT No. 97, supra note 22, at 1.
118. The economic development theories of the Reagan administration are not new, nor
is the Caribbean Basin program novel in its attempt to impose foreign private investment
on the Third World. The United States government has often intervened in the Caribbean
and Central America in support of United States private investors. J. MARTIN, supra note
86, at 33-35 (1978). The Eisenhower administration formulated views about the relationship
of private investment to development very similar to those of the Reagan administration,
and, at the Inter-American Economic Conference in 1954, refused, in terms which would be
echoed by the proponents of the Caribbean Basin program, to grant development assistance
to the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean: "Administration doctrine ... held
that we should rely on private investment, should be most cautious about diverting govern-
ment funds into schemes overseas, and must prevent any tampering with the free play of
market forces and capital movement. Secretary (of the Treasury, George M.) Humphrey
urged the Latin American finance ministers to go home and get inflation under control and
maintain realistic exchange rates in order to attract more private foreign investment for n
private investment lay their salvation." Id. at 33. What the Reagan administration ought to
have learned from these prior experiments is that private investment does not produce eco-
nomic development in Third World countries: "[E]xclusive reliance on private sector deci-
sions guarantees neither equitable development nor efficient market responsiveness. History
tells us differently. The grinding poverty faced by so many in the region is more the result
of generations of private sector decisions than of an overactive public presence." 1982 Hear-
ings, supra note 2, at 199 (statement of Weintraub).
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price to be paid for economic growth, development of integrated
regional or national economies does not result. Not even Puerto
Rico, which has been held up as a model for the economic growth
that can be attained by countries joining the CBI,'" has exper-
ienced the kind of development that would permit it to be self-
sustaining or would satisfy the basic needs of its population. Pu-
erto Rico's economic growth has been assisted by its relations with
the United States in ways that exceed the benefits available under
the CBI. As a United States possession, Puerto Rico has had not
only tariff-free trade with the United States, and investment tax
incentives, but it is also free, as Caribbean nations are not, from
restrictions on the emigration of its citizens to the mainland
United States, and from paying the costs of defense and social ser-
vices by itself.l20 Yet, economic growth in Puerto Rico has not sig-
nificantly countered poverty; growth has been accompanied by
high unemployment, increasing capital outflows, and continuing
dependency.12
The implementation of the CBI will have a number of adverse
consequences for the economies of the Caribbean and Central
America. Although tourism is a major industry of Caribbean coun-
tries, the program provides no support for the tourism industry.
Since United States investors can obtain the benefits of duty-free
trade and tax credits in any of the countries of the region that is
granted beneficiary country status, most investors will probably
congregate in those countries in which the infrastructure and other
conditions considered necessary for investment are most ad-
vanced. 22 As a result, the gap between the rich and poor countries
within the region, and between those countries that are relatively
industrialized and those that are not, will widen. Because the tax
credit will reward businesses for bringing capital to the region, but
not for increasing jobs, new industries are likely to be capital in-
tensive, and labor extensive, so that the area will continue to expe-
rience debilitating unemployment levels.123
119. 1981 Hearings, supra note 1, at 169-70 (statements of Lande and Bolton).
120. Weintraub, supra note 40, at 132. J. MARnN, supra note 86, at 59-61.
121. Puerto Rico 's unemployment rate has been at least thirty percent since 1975, de-
spite the migration of more than a million Puerto Ricans to the mainland. J. MARTIN, supra
note 86, at 62. Between one-half and two-thirds of Puerto Rican families are eligible for
food stamps. Weintraub, supra note 40, at 132. See also 1982 Hearings, supra note 2, at 195
(statement of Weintraub).
122. Eastern Caribbean Report, supra note 49, at 20; 1982 Hearings, supra note 2, at
213.
123. 1981 Hearings, supra note 1, at 48-51 (statement of Weisskopf); Conference, supra
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The CBI provides no funds for social service programs that
might ameliorate the effects of poverty and unemployment. Indus-
tries created under the Caribbean Basin program will tend to be in
the export sector, in order to obtain the benefits of duty-free trade,
so the needs of the less developed countries for infrastructure and
import substitution industries will not be satisfied.'" In addition,
these export-sector industries are likely, in order to reduce costs, to
utilize the advanced technology available from parent companies,
rather than technology that might be more suitable to the smaller
markets and traditional sectors of the host country. ' Since most
new plants will be capital intensive, relying on advanced technol-
ogy and equipment which are available only in the developed in-
dustrial economies, they will increase the dependence of the econo-
mies of the region upon imports. This tendency is heightened by
the requirement that materials purchased with ESF economic as-
sistance funds be of United States origin."2 6 This, in turn, will in-
crease the balance of trade and payments deficits that the region
has been experiencing. The CBI will not, in all likelihood, lead to
increased domestic private investment. Since foreign investors are
better credit risks, their increased presence in the economy will at-
tract credit away from domestic entrepreneurs.'2 7 In sum, the CBI
is likely to lead the economies of the Caribbean and Central
America deeper into dependency and further from development.
V. CONCLUSION
The Caribbean Basin Initiative has been described by its
drafters as an economic assistance program for the countries of the
Caribbean and Central America. However, it is unlikely to have
any but adverse consequences for the governments and peoples of
those regions. To the extent that it achieves its aims, it will fulfill
two purposes. First, it will assist United States businesses invest-
ing in Caribbean Basin countries, and, second, it will maintain the
economic and military predominance of the United States in the
western hemisphere.
The program purports to provide economic benefits to those
note 60, at 34, 92.
124. Misplaced Emphasis, supra note 84, at 116.
125. Conference, supra note 60, at 91-92.
126. DeWitt, The Inter-American Development Bank and Policy Making in Costa
Rica, 15 J. DzVELOPING AREAS, 67, at 71 (1981).
127. R. BARNET and R. MULLER, GLOBAL REACH 139 (1973).
19831
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
nations that qualify, under its terms, for beneficiary or recipient
status. Most of the benefits it provides, however, will accrue to
United States investors and interests. For example, qualifying
countries will be limited to those that demonstrate their allegiance
to the economic and political ideologies of the United States and
which create conditions in which investors from the United States
may flourish, essentially unchecked by regulations, taxes, public
sector competition, or the fear of expropriation.
The benefits to be provided to qualifying countries consist pri-
marily of investment tax credits for United States businesses and
duty-free trade. Neither of these is likely to have a substantial ef-
fect on the economies of beneficiary countries. To the extent that
there is an effect, it is likely to be adverse. United States investors
will, however, benefit from these provisions.
The program promises very little direct economic assistance to
Caribbean and Central American countries. Those funds that are
authorized are to be expended in supporting private investment
and in sustaining what the Reagan administration believes to be
the security interests of the United States. Assistance funds will
not be utilized to provide needed social, educational and health
services to people in the countries of the region.
The CBI was promulgated despite the reservations of other
countries that provide trade, investment, and assistance to Central
America and the countries of the Caribbean, and seemingly in ig-
norance of the real needs of Third World nations. It will, however,
be welcomed by the private sector, for its provisions offer a wind-
fall of unanticipated profits and unexpected savings to private
investors.
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